"A day which will live in Infamy"

 "A day which will live in Infamy" 

On the 79th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, shocking colorized photographs show the horror of the attack that claimed more than 2,400 lives and pulled the US into the Second World War.

The Pearl Harbor attack lasted 110 minutes, from 7:55 a.m. until 9:45 a.m.

When Japanese Commander Mitsuo Fuchida called out, “Tora, Tora, Tora!” (“Tiger, Tiger, Tiger!”) upon flying over Pearl Harbor, it was a message to the entire Japanese navy telling them they had caught the Americans totally by surprise.

Many U.S. servicemen were either still in their pajamas or eating breakfast in the mess halls when the attack on Pearl Harbor began. U.S. servicemen also identified the invading planes as Japanese because of the “meatballs,” what they called the large, red circle (the Rising Sun) on the side of Japanese planes.

There were eight battleships at Pearl Harbor that day, which included all the battleships of the U.S. Pacific fleet except for one (the Colorado).

The Japanese only attacked the ships at Pearl Harbor Naval base and airplanes at Hickman Airfield, leaving surrounding areas such as repair facilities, the submarine base and fuel oil storages areas unharmed. 

The Japanese struck the airfields at Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, Ewa Field, Schoefield Barracks, and Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

 The United States aircraft carriers, the primary target of the attack, were not at the base at the time.

Because of this, the Japanese cancelled a planned second attack.

The Japanese attackers traveled 3,400 miles across the Pacific to execute their attack on Pearl Harbor. 

In addition, the Japanese attack force stationed itself approximately 230 miles north of the Hawaiian island of Oahu.

The USS Arizona exploded when a bomb breached its forward magazine (i.e. the ammunition room). 

Approximately 1,100 U.S. servicemen died on board. After being torpedoed, the USS Oklahoma was damaged so badly that it turned upside down.

Senior officers in the Japanese Navy opposed a full-scale Pearl Harbor attack.

The operation was inspired by Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the Combined Fleet. 

The most important critic was an officer senior to Yamamoto; this was Admiral Nagano, the chief of the Naval General Staff. Nagano had less confidence in air power and he was wary of risking so much of the fleet in a distant operation.

 He was especially reluctant to risk the entire carrier force so far from Japan at a time when Japan planned attacks thousands of miles away against Malaya and the Philippines. Yamamoto demanded the use of all six big carriers, and had to threaten resignation to get a decision in his favour.

The failure to patrol the approaches to Pearl Harbor was partly the result of American offensive war plans.

There were a large number of US long-range aircraft in the Pacific, but they were not used to safeguard Hawaii. A force of B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers had been sent by the US Army to the Philippines.

 The 80 PBY Catalina flying boats available to the Navy were assigned to the Philippines or earmarked for offensive actions against the Japanese-held Marshall Islands.

The Pearl Harbor attack did not destroy the American Fleet.

The American commanders at Pearl Harbour were not scapegoats

Admiral Kimmel, C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet, and General Short, C-in-C of US Army forces on Hawaii (including air defence forces) were dismissed a few days after the attack.

 Some months later, the first US government enquiry found there had been dereliction of duty on the part of these two officers, and that they had made errors of judgment. Consequently, they were retired from their respective services.

Although many writers have attempted to defend Kimmel and Short, the two officers did bear responsibility for the unreadiness of the forces under their command, especially as they had been given a ‘war warning’ on 24 November. ( this fact is matter of debate and disputed).

On the other hand, misjudgments made by superiors of Kimmel and Short in Washington did not come in for open criticism, and Admiral Bloch, a senior admiral responsible for the naval defence of Hawaii, escaped open censure. 

In fact, officers in Washington, not the commanders in Hawaii, should have borne the lion’s share of the blame for the surprise at Pearl Harbor. 

Throughout 1941, Navy headquarters had failed to meet Kimmel’s repeated requests for more reconnaissance planes and crew, which might have made it possible to spot the Japanese strike force as it approached Hawaii.

Worse, Washington had failed to pass along intelligence pointing to Pearl Harbor as a likely target—denying Kimmel key data that could have alerted him to Tokyo’s plans. 

Hesitation and incompetence in the final hours before the attack—not least by Adm. Harold Stark, the chief of naval operations—meant that a last-minute warning didn’t reach Kimmel until eight hours after the attack began.

Poor coordination between the US Army and US Navy was a systemic problem, not one caused by Kimmel and Short.

Hitler’s declaration of war on the US on 11 December was not a result of Pearl Harbor

For Japan, Pearl Harbor was both a success and a failure

The attack did change the strategic situation. 

The pre-war military strategy of Britain and the US was to assemble strong forces in the west (at Singapore) and the east (at Hawaii), to deter Japan by threatening a two-front war. Pearl Harbor removed the American part of the deterrent.

 It made possible the rapid conquest of Malaya, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

On the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto had hoped to destroy the American carrier force, and this did not happen.

 And by mounting a surprise attack without a declaration of war, on a Sunday morning and killing several thousand Americans, the Japanese put American public opinion totally behind the war effort and awakened  a giant.