On January 1, 1942: the Alliance between Great Britain, The Soviet Union.

 The Alliance between Great Britain, The Soviet Union, and the United States were probably the grandest of all the grand alliances in history.

 It was also, despite its successful outcome fraught with deep mistrust and misunderstanding.

 The United Nations alliance led by the aforementioned "Big Three" officially began on January 1, 1942, less than a month after the United States officially entered the war.

 However, before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. was doing everything to help the Alliance of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R by supplying them with goods and war materials. 

Before Germany attacked the Soviets, we must never forget that they were in a mutual non-aggression pact together.

 When Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, Britain, who had stood alone fighting the mighty German Army, immediately reached out to the Soviets about allying. An Alliance was reached on July 12, 1941. 

Britain was distraught that the Soviets would join the Germans in helping to defeat Britain and carve up their Empire. 

Churchill, a fervent anti-communist, realized to his credit that Germany was the more significant threat than communist Russia and famously said that "If Hitler invaded Hell, he would at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.

The Beginning of the Alliance was more of the enemy of my enemy is my friend arrangement, with most experts agreeing that the Soviet Union would never hold out against the undefeated and seemingly invincible Wehrmacht.

 The British and Americans were faced with the dilemma of sending needed military equipment to the Soviets to fight the common enemy but seeing that equipment was lost or taken over by Germans when the Soviets were defeated.

 In the end, Churchill and Roosevelt thought it best to give all they could to the Soviets, and whatever supplies that could be sent were, many times, at the expense of Great Britain's needs. 

Even from this early period of the Alliance, before Pearl Harbor, the Soviets were demanding the Western powers for a second front on the continent of Europe to alleviate the pressure on the Soviet front. 

Stalin was more realistic in 1941 and did not push tremendously hard for a second front because the U.S. was not in the war yet. 

Great Britain was certainly not capable of an invasion potent enough to draw off any divisions from the East.

 However, as soon as the U.S. was in the fight, the Soviets demanded a second front on France in 1942. 

Not only this but also a dramatic increase in the supplies to the Red Army. 

In the cables between the Alliance, Stalin was always demanding of his partners more and more, seemingly the impossible. 

The mistrust between the Big Three during 1942-43 was great. On the Soviet's side, they felt the Western Powers were content to sit it out and not invade France.

 They would only fight peripheral battles in Africa, stick to hunting U-boats in the Atlantic and carry out Bombing missions to Germany.

 To talin, this meant the Soviets and Germans would fight to the death, losing millions of men and devastate their countries, while the U.S. and Great Britain came in at the end, with comparatively little loss and be the dominant post-war powers. 

On the Anglo-American side, they were always concerned that the Soviets would, once they stopped the Germans and kicked them back far enough, sign a separate peace with Hitler and allow him to concentrate all his resources against them. 

It is easy to look a this in hindsight.

 We know that it was almost impossible for Hitler and Stalin to sign a separate peace, After all this was in essence and battle to conquer or die, and to change those war aims mid-stream was unthinkable after so much loss of life and damage done.

 Also, Stalin had the American military on his side regarding the cross-channel attack in France, even in 1942.

 Only the sensible British pointed out that with the American Army not yet strong enough in numbers, this would be mainly a British operation. 

They understood that any invasion in 1942 would be folly and not only be decimated but do no good to the Russians and not siphon off any divisions from the Russian front. 

This was, of course, proved when the Anglo-Americans invaded French North Africa in 1942 and against a lesser German-Italian force did not perform well in the least.

1943 was a different story; it is possible that if the Anglo-Americans stopped after North Africa and diverted all their forces to England, they could have invaded in 1943. 

It is arguable if it could have succeeded without the year of build-up in airpower and landing craft. In the end, the Anglo-Americans decided to knock Italy out of the war instead. 

Stalin always thought this Mediterranean strategy a sideshow and not helping to defeat the Germans.

 However, the evidence does not hold up. When the U.S. and British invaded Sicily in July 1943, the Germans were in a titanic offensive in the East at the Battle of Kursk.

 After the invasion, Hitler immediately called off the offensive and sent divisions to Italy. So, although by no means did that win the Battle of Kursk, it did help divert Hitler's attention to the West. 

When the Big Three met in Tehran at the end of 1943, The British still tried to talk the U.S. and Soviets out of a cross-channel attack in 1944. 

They wanted to expand their operations in the Mediterranean. The Americans, by this time, were without a doubt the senior partner in the Anglo-American relationship. 

They firmly sided with a cross-channel attack in 1944, with no more "sideshows.

After hearing what he thought were promises of cross-channel attacks in 1942 and 1943, Stalin, still very skeptical, asked who will lead this invasion? Roosevelt said it had not been decided yet. 

Stalin immediately said, then the attack will not happen. 

How can you have an attack when you do not even know who will command it. 

The 1943 Tehran conference was a low point in the Alliance, the distrust and even open hostility of Stalin towards his partners was evident. Stalin's obstinance, however, did pay off. 

Roosevelt was trying very hard at this conference to placate Stalin and cultivate a good relationship with him. Even to the expense of Churchill, Roosevelt chooses sides with Stalin in almost all discussions. 

Most especially regarding an attack on France in 1944. Stalin's remark about not having a commander for the cross-channel attack spurred Roosevelt to act. 

Whereas most likely, he did not choose one earlier because it was assumed George Marshal would be chosen, and Roosevelt did not want Marshall to lead it but did not find the courage to decide it yet.

 On his way back to the U.S. after the conference, Roosevelt informed Marshall and Eisenhower that Eisenhower would be the Supreme Allied Commander in charge of the cross-channel invasion, set for May 1944.

It is almost sure the Western Allies would have invaded France in 1944 regardless of Stalin's constant harping. However, Stalin's constant refrain for attacking France cannot be discounted as playing a role.

 Roosevelt had listed to Churchill and taken his advice for the operations in 1942 and 1943.

 However, it was an intelligent military strategy and realization that the U.S. was not capable in 1942 or 1943 of a direct attack on fortress Europe, not a blind faith in Churchill's judgment that led to those decisions. 

The Alliance, in the end, survived because, in the beginning, Roosevelt worked closely and in harmony with Churchill to get the Alliance in a position to be able to attack France in 1944. 

Moreover, from the end of 1943 to 1945, he realized the post-war world would have only two great powers, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and worked to cultivate his relations with Stalin to try and get a smooth transition to peace following the war. 

Roosevelt's flexibility worked well as the intermediary between the inflexible Stalin and the declining influence of Churchill and Great Britain's desires. 

The Alliance was successful, but it was not easy. It famously did not last long after the peace. 

However, they did hold together and compromised long enough to defeat the greatest threat to Western Civilization since the Muslims invaded Europe in the 8th century. 

The cross-channel invasion in June 1944 was the culmination of all the infighting the Alliance withstood for almost three years.

 There was no question that the Soviets took the brunt of the fighting and defeating the German Army. 

However, I do not think the Allies ever put Stalin in his place about this. This was not the Anglo-American's fault. 

Hitler invasion of Soviet Russia always seemed to be a guilt trip towards the Western Allies when in fact, they were helping the Soviets when Britain could have been calloused in June 1941 and said to the Soviets, good luck with that old chap, see what happens when you try and play nice with Hitler.

 Nevertheless, in the end, the Soviets needed to survive, and they did, and the help they got from lend-lease supply was not inconsequential.  

Any alliance is hard, and there is bound to be mistrust, but the Big Three in World War II did just enough to keep mistrust under the surface to forge ahead to victory over the common enemy.